
On Nashsolvability of finite nperson deterministic graphical games; Catch 22
We consider finite nperson deterministic graphical (DG) games. These ga...
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Computations and Complexities of Tarski's Fixed Points and Supermodular Games
We consider two models of computation for Tarski's order preserving func...
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Controlling network coordination games
We study a novel control problem in the context of network coordination ...
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Bestresponse dynamics in directed network games
We study public goods games played on networks with possibly nonrecipro...
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Financial Network Games
We study financial systems from a gametheoretic standpoint. A financial...
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A Refined Study of the Complexity of Binary Networked Public Goods Games
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model o...
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Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ωRegular Boolean Objectives
We study multiplayer turnbased games played on a finite directed graph ...
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Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed nonnegative integer bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We identify natural classes of graphs for which finite improvement or coalitionimprovement paths of polynomial length always exist, and, as a consequence, a (pure) Nash equilibrium or a strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. The considered classes of graphs are typical in network topologies: simple cycles correspond to the token ring local area networks, while open chains of simple cycles correspond to multiple independent rings topology from the recommendation G.8032v2 on the Ethernet ring protection switching. For simple cycles these results are optimal in the sense that without the imposed conditions on the weights and bonuses a Nash equilibrium may not even exist. Finally, we prove that the problem of determining the existence of a Nash equilibrium or of a strong equilibrium in these games is NPcomplete already for unweighted graphs and with no bonuses assumed. This implies that the same problems for polymatrix games are strongly NPhard.
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